On October 26th, 2024, a controversial organisation will celebrate its birthday: the European Border and Coast Guard Agency will be 20 years old. 20 years of turning a blind eye to human rights violations and 20 years of preventing migration without regard for fundamental rights. For us, this is neither a reason to congratulate nor to celebrate. We spoke to Frontex expert Matthias Monroy about what the creation of Frontex in 2004 has meant for people seeking protection, and how the agency’s goals and priorities have changed over the past two decades.
What was the EU’s motivation for founding Frontex in 2004?
The creation of Frontex is primarily linked to the decision to abolish controls at the EU’s internal borders as part of the Schengen Agreement. In several five-year programmes and finally in the Treaty of Lisbon, it was decided to strengthen the protection of the EU’s external borders and to cooperate more closely on security issues within the European Union.
Two decades have now passed. How have the objectives changed in that time?
In a nutshell, you could say that Frontex has become autonomous. Originally, the executive bodies were still supposed to be the Member States, for example their coastguards or competent authorities at the land borders. In the meantime, however, Frontex has mutated into a border police force with its own armed and uniformed personnel, commanded from Warsaw. In 2016, Frontex’s regulations were amended to allow the agency to purchase its own equipment. With a further amendment in 2019, the agency began recruiting its own staff – allowing it to act independently of member states. However, these Frontex border guards still need to be invited by the countries concerned to operate in certain places. For this purpose, the EU Commission can also approach the states and ask them to issue an invitation.
What factors have driven this development?
One event that had a decisive influence on the development of Frontex was the reaction to the summer of migration, i.e. the period from 2014 onwards when many people fled to Europe, especially from Syria. To this day, right-wing and conservative circles criticise Angela Merkel for not closing the borders – which would not have worked in practice. The EU’s response, however, was to massively strengthen Frontex and further expand Fortress Europe.
Let’s take a look at the Mediterranean: what are Frontex’s specific tasks and how are they being implemented?
In 2013, there were two major shipwrecks off the coast of Lampedusa, and the Italian navy launched the Mare Nostrum maritime rescue operation. In less than a year, 150,000 people were rescued by this operation. But Mare Nostrum was cancelled under pressure from the EU. Frontex then stepped in with the Triton mission. However, this was never designed for rescue at sea, but for border protection. Frontex has now largely withdrawn its ships and only monitors refugees from the air. Frontex charters drones and small planes from private companies to fly over the Mediterranean – mostly in the Libyan Sea Rescue Zone.
And what happens when Frontex discovers a boat carrying people seeking protection?
When Frontex discovers boats, it usually reports them to the relevant sea rescue centres, including those in Libya. On the face of it, this sounds good: people are rescued and Frontex fulfils its obligations under international law. But in actual fact, it is legally forbidden to return people seeking protection to Libya. This is due to Libya’s civil war and refugees are at risk of serious human rights violations such as torture, slavery and rape.
At this point, it is important to note that Libya has only had its own sea rescue coordination centre since 2018. As mentioned above, EU Member States and Frontex are subject to the ‘non-refoulement’ principle, which means that they are not allowed to transfer asylum seekers to Libya – but the Libyan authorities are. Libya has therefore been encouraged to declare a sea rescue zone and set up a control centre. This can now be called by Frontex when its aerial surveillance detects people in distress at sea. You could even say that Frontex is doing air surveillance for Libya to prevent people from reaching Europe – without any official cooperation with Libya.
You said earlier that Frontex is constantly increasing its equipment and staff. Where exactly is all the money going as the agency expands?
Frontex has moved from the sea to the air in recent years, and that obviously costs a lot of money. A quarter to a third of Frontex’s total budget goes into air surveillance. I did a study on this two years ago and Frontex had already spent around 300 million euros on drones and aircraft contracts. The drone framework contracts renewed this year alone cost 400 million.
How modern is the equipment?
Frontex has always been at the forefront of technology. The aircraft used by Frontex for border surveillance are equipped with cameras, infrared and radar. In addition, satellite phones, which refugees often have on their boats, can be tracked by those same satellites. This technology is provided by companies and is particularly useful in poor visibility or at night. And Frontex is now researching so-called high-flying platforms that can move autonomously in the stratosphere: The agency has spent €5 million on a research project with Airbus to bridge the gap between planes, drones and satellites. At least that’s what Frontex says – as if there is a gap.
In principle, this technology is not bad – for example, it could be an important addition to help locate boats in distress as quickly as possible.
The Mediterranean is probably the most closely monitored sea in the world. And of course the technology could help find people in distress at sea more quickly. Frontex always reacts very indignantly when people accuse it of only acquiring and using this whole arsenal for migration control – justifying it by saying that it intervenes when it detects an emergency at sea. But these emergencies are reported to Libya, not to the civilian rescue ships. In this way, Frontex helps to ensure that people seeking protection are returned to Libyan camps, where they face serious human rights violations.
Frontex has not only been criticised for its handling of Libya. There have also been numerous reports that the agency has stood by and watched pushbacks or other human rights violations take place. Have these allegations had any consequences?
Measures have already been taken. In 2022, for example, the then head of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, was forced to resigned. He saw Frontex purely as an agency for defending against migration and is now a member of parliament for the far-right Rassemblement National party in France. His successor, Hans Leijtens from the Netherlands, is pursuing a different policy, at least in public. The reporting system was also changed under his watch. Frontex has so-called fundamental rights observers who are present during operations. Under Leggeri, not one of these posts was filled – there should now be around 50. For comparison: Frontex decided in 2019 to create a permanent reserve of 10,000 border guards by 2027. The figures make it clear that fundamental rights observers are only a fraction of that. And they cannot intervene, they can only report. In practice, the human rights observers have little impact: in Greece, for example, the coastguard carries out pushbacks, deliberately risking lives – as the BBC reported just this year. Frontex is on the ground and, as an international organisation, could keep an eye on them. Note, ‘could’ – because in reality they don’t: it has been reported on several occasions that Frontex planes fly away to avoid witnessing such practices. So the organisation continues to look the other way.
These fundamental rights observers are themselves part of Frontex – and therefore not independent. Is there an external control body for Frontex?
Frontex definitely lacks independent observers who can uncover scandals and also influence what happens to their reports. This role is currently played only by journalists and human rights organisations. At the moment, they are the only ones who ensure that something happens after these reports, which they often request using freedom of information laws. The fewer checks and balances there are on Frontex, the more important the work of activists and the media is, because it is really the only way to put Frontex in its place. Public reporting also led to the resignation of Fabrice Leggeri, for example.
Frontex is a European government agency. Surely the EU must at least have some means of control?
It doesn’t work in the same way as, say, the German Federal Police, which in Germany can be ordered to do something by the Ministry of the Interior. There is no single body in the EU that can give Frontex such instructions. This is because the EU is not a separate state, but an umbrella organisation of member states. As a result, we now have an agency that is becoming increasingly independent. The only thing the member states can do is exert pressure – for example, by dismissing the director. The EU Parliament also has some influence, for example by not approving the budget. But so far this has only been a symbolic gesture.
There is also the European Court of Justice and the Council of Europe’s Court of Human Rights, which review Frontex’s compliance with EU law and human rights. The cases heard there are important. But they usually take years and don’t always end well.
What are Frontex’s plans for the coming years?
Ursula von der Leyen has announced that she wants to triple the size of the permanent reserve, i.e. Frontex’s new border force, to 30,000 officers. Next year, Frontex’s annual budget could exceed one billion euros. Frontex will also get more of its own equipment. It is also planned that Frontex will increasingly be deployed outside the EU.
Wait, a European border protection agency outside the EU’s borders?
When Frontex was set up, it was intended to operate only within EU member states. Since 2016, however, Frontex has been able to deploy personnel in neighbouring third countries. This is regulated by status agreements, which currently exist with Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. From 2019, Frontex will also be allowed to enter into such agreements with non-neighbouring countries such as Kosovo. The EU Commission is also currently trying to conclude agreements with African countries such as Senegal and Mauritania. Negotiations are proving difficult, however, as governments know their price and what it means for the EU if Frontex is allowed to operate on the ground. In addition to the status agreements, there are also various working agreements, for example on the exchange of data.
Do you believe that an organisation like Frontex can be reformed?
Under no circumstances can Frontex be reformed and it should be abolished on these grounds. Even if the individual states have to handle migration in some way – which they already do with various authorities and bodies – we don’t need an organisation whose primary goal is to prevent migration and which even accepts human rights violations to do so. Furthermore, the approach of preventing people from entering irregularly at the borders is completely wrong as long as this is the only way to apply for asylum in a country in Europe.
What are your demands of the EU with regard to Frontex?
The member states should do what the civilian sea rescue organisations are doing now – namely ensuring that no people die in the Mediterranean. This should not be the task of organisations that are financed by donations, but a state task. Or even better: the policy would be changed so that people no longer have to flee at all. Then we wouldn’t need a sea rescue service.
About Matthias Monroy
Matthias Monroy worked for many years for a German MP. Today he is editor of the political section of the daily newspaper Neues Deutschland. He specialises in police, secret services and the military in Germany and the EU, as well as new applications for surveillance and control.
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